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
PLANNING FOR POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING AND VALIDATION  
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
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# STUDENT ESSAY

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AD-A168 414

PLANNING FOR POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING AND VALIDATION

BY

COLONEL WESLEY A. BEAL

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reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) for the execution of any major war plan. Although the USAR and the ARNG may be able to perform their wartime mission, these forces must be able to get to the theater, on schedule, with the proper training; and the CINC must know the combat status of the units.

Systems exist to identify the numbers of equipment and personnel; cross-leveling then increases the combat readiness of the deploying units. However, a subjective evaluation is required in order to determine the training status and validate the units.

This paper reviews post-mobilization planning systems at the installation level and proposes that the U.S. Army develop a comprehensive system for determining the post-mobilization training requirements of a Reserve Component unit, and for validating combat readiness prior to deployment.

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**USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER**

**PLANNING FOR POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING AND VALIDATION**

**INDIVIDUAL ESSAY**

by

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US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
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# ABSTRACT

**AUTHOR:** Wesley A. Beal, COL, SC, USAR

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Although there are many management systems supporting planning data for post-mobilization requirements, the installations designated to receive the Reserve Component forces do not have a common system to identify the training status and needs of the units upon arrival. Further, the Installation Commander has the responsibility for validating the combat readiness of these units prior to deployment. The guidance and policy in this critical area is not consistent among the various commands involved.)

The growing interest in mobilization results from the increased US reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) for the execution of any major war plan. Although the USAR and the ARNG may be able to perform their wartime mission, these forces must be able to get to the theater, on schedule, with the proper training; and the CINC must know the combat status of the units.

Systems <sup>systems</sup> exist to identify the numbers of equipment and personnel; crossleveling ~~then~~ increases the combat readiness of the deploying units. However, a subjective evaluation is required in order to determine the training status and validate the units.

This paper reviews post-mobilization planning systems at the installation level and proposes that the US Army develop a comprehensive system for determining the post-mobilization training requirements of a Reserve Component unit, and for validating combat readiness prior to deployment. R

## PLANNING FOR POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING AND VALIDATION

### INTRODUCTION

One of the more critical phases of mobilization of the reserve components occurs after the unit arrives at the designated mobilization station. The identification of administrative requirements that will be placed on the installation at this time is key to insuring that the unit is able to deploy in accordance with the established schedule.

During peacetime planning, the post commander must insure that the arrangements for billeting, ranges, training areas, ammunition, etc. have been made, and are coordinated with the arrival and deployment dates of the units scheduled to mobilize at his installation. The management systems needed by the installation commander to identify unit requirements, to establish installation schedules, and identify resource shortfalls have been developed but never fully implemented.

The importance of post mobilization management was emphasized by General John Wickham, the current Army Chief of Staff in the following statement:

Every major Army operational plan's troop list contains reserve units...we have an increasing reliance on the reserve component...our plans must be aligned to insure early and effective call-up and post mobilization management [emphasis added] of those (RC) units that provide the tactical staying power.<sup>3</sup>

This paper reviews post-mobilization planning systems at installation level and proposes that the Army develop a comprehensive system for determining post-mobilization training requirements and for evaluating combat readiness prior to deployment.



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## MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Policy guidance for mobilization management starts with Army Regulation 500-5 and the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). This guidance is implemented by Forces Command (FORSCOM) Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) which provides detailed guidance for unit and installation commanders. Each installation has a Mobilization Plan based primarily on the above guidance and the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP).

Additional guidance and policy for the "mob-planner" at installation level is available from many sources, and varies in as many ways. These will be discussed as each aspect of post-mobilization training and validation is addressed below.

The management information systems used for mobilization planning are key to the use of the data concerning both the reserve component units and the installations (mobilization stations). The unit and troop stationing data is accessed through the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCS). The data concerning the status of the units is being developed by FORSCOM and the Continental United States Armies (CONUSA'S). They are using the Developmental Army Readiness and Mobilization System (DARMS), which will contain the unit and installation Post-mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR).

## RC UNIT TRAINING MANAGEMENT

Without a doubt, the biggest improvement in the mobilization management system in the recent past is the CAPSTONE program. This aligns reserve units with their parent units for the assigned war plans. With guidance from the gaining commander, the reserve unit commander can plan better for training and

mobilization based on his designated wartime commitment.

This training requirement is based on the CAPSTONE mission statement and is expressed in the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks and sub-tasks that the unit must be proficient in for its assigned mission. Normally, the number of tasks is considerably less than the total that would be required in the mission statement in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and the total ARTEP. This is because certain types of maneuvers and operations may not be required by the unit's wartime mission. A river crossing may not apply, for example, to a unit operating in a desert area without any rivers. A mechanized infantry battalion could have its tasks reduced by as much as 50 percent depending on the mission statement.

Reserve units are required to formally identify these tasks and report the status of training to these tasks annually on FORSCOM Form 1-1-R as outlined in FORSCOM Pamphlet 135-3. This form is used to record the annual evaluation of training conducted during the unit's two week annual training (AT) period. The form provides for both a commander's pre-AT and an evaluator's post-AT assessment in terms of whether or not the unit is trained to standard, or additional or intensive training is needed for each task. There is also space for listing projected training for the next year, and post-mobilization training needed. The problem is that there is insufficient guidance for determining the post-mobilization training requirement. If the unit were mobilized right after AT, it would need post-mobilization training in all tasks that were not rated as trained to standard by the evaluator. There may be some tasks that, due to a lack of equipment or training areas, may always be a post-mobilization requirement. The instructions in the FORSCOM pamphlet indicates that this is a yes or no determination; however, information on the

number of days required to complete this training would be more useful to the planners.

It should be noted here that the 1-1R is not normally provided to the installation serving as the mobilization station for the unit in any case. The same is true of the Unit Status Report (USR) required by AR 220-1 and reported on DA Form 2715. This report is the same as the one required for active units. The regulation is currently under revision, and will increase the frequency of reporting for reserve units from every six months to quarterly. The training status, or "C-rating", is based on the commander's subjective evaluation and is expressed in the number of days required to train the unit up to standard in all the tasks assigned in its wartime mission; CAPSTONE mission for reserve units. These tasks should be the same ones listed on the FORSCOM Form 1-1-R; the Mission Essential Task List or METL.

Resource constraints which prevent the unit from achieving its training objectives are also listed on the USR; however, it is not possible to tell, in the case of a reserve unit, if the constraints are related to home station inactive duty, annual, or post-mobilization training. For this reason, among others, it would be difficult for the planner at the installation to determine the unit's requirements from the USR.

There are a number of other indicators that could indicate the pre-mobilization training status of a unit; such as Inspector general reports, Readiness Group assistance reports, unit advisor reports, and other evaluations routinely conducted by various commands. These are outlined in the responsibilities of the CONUSA'S in FORMDEPS. FORMDEPS also refers to the Post-Mobilization Training Plan and the FORSCOM Form 78-R, which is in the process of transition to the automated DAPMS system being tested in First and Fifth US

Army at the present time.

The new DARMS resulted from a long history of problems in mobilization management starting with exercise "Nifty Nugget" in 1978 and ending with the Vice Chief of Staff's Functional Area Assessment in 1983. All indicators pointed to the fact that, among many other problems, one of the most significant was the lack of data that the designated mobilization stations had concerning the status of the units that they would receive. Mobilization Stations were unable to forecast resource requirements accurately and thereby successfully compete for the resources to provide for post-mobilization requirements.

#### POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING PLANS

Initially, the post-mobilization training plans (FORSCOM Form 78-R, with a number of attachments) were to be prepared by all units and consolidated at the major command level (State Adjutant General, Army Reserve Command, Training Division, etc.) and forwarded to the installation. Then, in FY85, the routing changed to include the CONUSA's, and an installation shortfall report was added. This system was completely manual and was never fully implemented. First US Army experienced a 50 percent unit completion rate, and received only a few installation shortfall reports which were not useable.<sup>2</sup>

Mobilization stations claimed that the 78-R data was both inaccurate and incomplete, and that turned out to be true in most cases. One of the problems was that the system was manual and slow; the other was that the data was never verified as it was submitted. However, as in most cases concerning mobilization, some installations initiated independent projects to meet their perceived needs locally, due to the lack of coordination and guidance from higher headquarters. They verified and used the data on their own or set up

automated systems to properly manipulate the data. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA and Fort Stewart, GA did this with excellent results. Fort Stewart's system is called the Mobilization Deployment Support System (MDSS) and includes graphics to depict the building plan as well as reports on administrative and training functional areas. Fort Indiantown Gap has all unit requirements in a data base system with various reports sorted by time, unit, or function. In both cases, the data was obtained from the old FORSCOM Form 78-R. The problem is that the resources to develop independent systems should have been expended one time with a consolidated effort at FORSCOM. This was finally initiated in FY85 with the automated Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR) system on DARMS.

#### DARMS AND PTSR

The automated system was first tested in FY85 by Fifth Army, and is currently being implemented by both Fifth and First Army for FY86. In FY87 it is planned for implementation in all CONUSA's. Meanwhile, there is a mix of old and new systems. There are no valid shortfall reports for the mobilization stations in any case, and a lack of command and control procedures at all levels to insure accuracy of information and uniformity of requirements.

The unit PTSR report is broken down into the following areas: general information, training, personnel and administration, intelligence and security, logistics, medical, dental, legal, communications and electronics, and ADP.

In the training section, the report covers:

- The date of the last external ARTEP or ATP.
- Requirements for ranges and maneuver areas.

- Ammunition requirements (for training).
- Individual training needs.
- Requirements for training aids.
- Special training support or material requirements.
- Total training days needed with and without equipment.
- Total training time at mob-station.

The total time is supposed to include simultaneous training and, according to the instructions, equal the total days available bases on the unit's planned deployment date. The obvious and frequently encountered problem is that the times usually are not equal. In most cases, the time required is in excess of the time available.

When training requirements exceed time available for training, the commander then is faced with a delimma. He has to revise his plans to either get some additional training accomplished during the annual training period or during the training year. Considering that there are only 39 days to do this with in the face of many other administrative and support requirements, it is difficult. What then usually happens? There is little or no chance of changing deployment dates for either equipment or personnel, little chance of obtaining additional equipment after the unit's own is shipped, and with all his flexibility gone, the unit is usually judged to need a little less post-mobilization training than it actually does in order to meet the time constraints.

Remember also, that this time should agree with the total time entered on the METL, and with the time on the USR. However this would only be the case in a static situation, or if all three reports were done at the same time. However, the USR is submitted quarterly, the METL is completed during the annual training period, and the PTSR is submitted at the beginning of each

fiscal year. . Significant changes occur in a reserve component unit during these times. Even from the time that the PTSR is initiated on 30 September until it is available to the mobilization station the following February, significant changes in the training requirements could occur due to personnel changes that are normal in a most units.

#### FIXING THE PROBLEM

One solution would be to combine, and possibly eliminate, reports. However, there is a note on the new form for the USR stating that the information is not to be used to determine combat readiness. One could suppose that there is a difference between combat readiness and unit status, or that the reports serve two totally different purposes. In fact, the regulation governing the USR states the purpose indicating that status is not a determination of combat capability. And what about the training required to get a unit up to the standard? Still assuming that the wartime ARTEP tasks (METL) are the standard and a valid measure, it would seem to be a fine line as to whether the post-mobilization training required was based on the days identified in the USR or the PTSR as long as they were based on the METL. In fact, the METL has at least been validated by the unit evaluator during the annual training period. Updating, at the present time, would only be as good as the commander's ability to judge his own unit during the rest of the training year.

Letting the USR go its own way and merely assuring that the number of days entry is based on the current METL is probably the best solution at the present time. Consideration here is given to the fact that the form is used both by the active and reserve components, and supports pre-programming and budgeting actions. It is currently under study again in a number of agencies

as part of an effort to develop a more accurate measurement technique which will insure sufficient funding for our forces in the future. If a better procedure is developed to measure unit status, it probably will impact on the equipment and personnel management systems instead of the training systems, in any case. This is due to the inherent subjective nature of the training evaluation and the fact that most commanders feel that the present system, using the wartime ARTEP tasks, is as good as it is going to get for a while.

Another fix that can be applied to the system is to refine the method for determining the number of days that a particular unit would need to train up to standard. If, for example, on the 1-1R, a unit was rated as needing additional or intensive training, the commander should have some guidance upon which to base his estimate. The only data presently available is the ARTEP task performance aids and the commander's judgement.

Another solution would be to add the 1-1R to the PTSR data base. This would eliminate the requirement to create a manual form each year during the busy annual training period. Instead, a current report could be produced from the DARMS system for evaluation and updating during the training period.

Combining the 1-1R and the PTSR would also change the unit evaluation based on METL from an annual to a continuous process and allow it to be used for other reports as well. Ideally, the METL would be a real-time snapshot of the training status or readiness of a unit. Being automated, it would be easy to update and keep current. It could then be added to the PTSR and the USR, and could be requested for review whenever an ARTEP or any other unit evaluation was being conducted. The METL could also be reviewed and evaluated quarterly along with the preparation of the USR. Instead of an annual training evaluation supplement, it would become a basic source document for



any decision, report, or evaluation requiring the training status of a unit. It could help to explain the need for additional equipment, personnel, or other resources; and provide an indicator for the impact of other resource decisions affecting the unit.

Although the concept of determining unit training status based on the METL and integrating the data with PTSR is feasible, there are some technical and management problems with the automated PTSR system itself that need attention at FORSCOM.

First, is the problem of accessibility. The system depends on the DARMS terminals which are not installed in all key locations. For example, the National Guard does not have compatible computer hardware at the state headquarters. A possible solution would be to upload the data to the National Guard Bureau for access by the CONUSA's or the mobilization stations for planning purposes.

Mobilization sites (which are subordinate to mobilization stations) do not have any equipment, and computers will not be issued at unit level for some time yet. Until computers are issued to unit (battalion and separate company) level, there will be a continued problem with slow, inaccurate manual reports.

What is really needed is a corporate data base with a network and procedures strictly for PTSR. At the present time the CONUSA's, the installations, the States, and the major USAR commands all have an interest in unit status. For example, mobilization stations may have units from many Army areas and states; a major USAR command could have units going to 20 or 30 different mobilization stations in 2 or 3 Army areas. Each requires access to reports and cumulative data from certain units, but not all units, for any

given system user.

At the present time, in First Army, the mobilization stations cannot access PTSR reports because the units had no instructions to input codes for their mobilization station assignment. In addition, the installation planner would only be able to access the same report format, by unit, as it was input. A program needs to be developed that would allow a roll-up of functional data for specific areas which are required to be addressed in the mobilization station shortfall report. These areas are: ranges by type, maneuver areas by size, ammunition by type, individual training requirements (no format), and training aids. The number of days, conflicts, scheduling, etc. are not addressed in this report, but at least the basic data could be accumulated and reported.

The mobilization stations, in most cases, have limited staff to work the post-mobilization training requirements. Additionally, there is little automation to support the effort. Some mob-planners have manually sorted out the range, ammunition, and training area requirements; but the unit configurations and state of training is constantly changing and rendering the requirements obsolete in a matter of months. Some planners have automated the data locally as discussed earlier and are providing a better service to the mobilizing units with this information.

The instructions for the PTSR mobilization station shortfall report requires an annual report on the first of June each year, with the total shortfalls in the categories mentioned above reported. One has to assume that this data must be obtained and manipulated manually, even after the proper unit PTSR reports are available to the mobilization station. The installation data should be operated as a distributed data base on a corporate system with

the ability to manipulate the data for the requirements for its own location.

Not only does the data need to be controlled, but central (FORSCOM) management of Army-wide data is necessary. For example, FORSCOM with a properly engineered system could determine and report on the total number of ranges that would have to be rehabilitated or constructed, and in what time frame for mobilization planning. This information could be used by the Corps of Engineers in their construction planning, as well as in the current budget projections.

Centralized records of shortfalls with progress reports on installation solutions and get-well dates can also be generated. A common problem such as the lack of maneuver space can be solved, in many cases, by agreements with State and local authorities for emergency use of park and game lands. An initiative for all mobilization stations with this problem can be tracked with an improved shortfall report system. Commanders can be informed and action can be taken at higher levels to assist, if necessary, in solving the problem.

First US Army has published a supplement to FORMDEPS which addresses MAT organization in some detail, but does not cover training and validation. However, there is an internal SOP for the mobilization plan review and approval process which has a detailed checklist for critical items which should be covered in the installation plan. The other CONUSAs may or may not have similar guidance, but in any case, it probably would not be consistent or complete. The problem is that many mobilizing units cross Army areas from home station to mobilization station. Therefore, the requirements that a major reserve command may have to deal with could vary for subordinate units depending upon where they mobilize. This is carried even further when one considers that each mobilization station may also place requirements on the

assigned units. The 79th Army Reserve Command, in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, for example, has units mobilizing at 20 different mobilization stations.

On the other hand, the installations have their problems also, over 100 units from various commands and States mobilize at both Fort Meade and at Fort Indiantown Gap. Currently some use the old post-mobilization training plan while others are under the PTSR automated system. Any meaningful consolidation by the installation at this point in time is virtually impossible. After PTSR is adopted throughout CONUS, there will still be a need to standardize plans and procedures for post-mobilization training requirements.

The logical place for needed standardization is the installation mobilization plan. This means that control of the plans and the policies must be directed by FORSCOM and executed by a single authority. At the present time, however, the degree of control over this planning process varies from installation to installation depending on which higher command has the mobilization planning responsibility.

In peacetime, for example, the CONUSA's have only planning authority over the installations designated as mobilization stations; however, after mobilization, CONUSA's have operational control for the execution of mobilization at FORSCOM installations, and operational control for mobilization of FORSCOM units only, at other installations. Additionally, these other installations have their own mobilization plan guidance from Training and Doctrine Command, Health Services Command, etc. TRADOC Installations are mainly concerned with training base expansion and individual training, but some of them mobilize FORSCOM units as well.

## READINESS GROUPS

Regardless of the complexity of command channels, FORSCOM is the major command with the majority of the installations concerned with post-mobilization unit training and validation, the CONUSA's are the planners, and the Readiness Groups (RG's) are the executors.

The RG's report directly to the CONUSA's during peacetime, but upon mobilization, they are supposed to expand and form the nucleus of the MAT for each mobilization station. At that time they report to the installation commander. First US Army, in their supplement to the FORMDEPS, retain control of the RG's, and place them under the operational control of the mobilization station commander.

The pre-mobilization mission of the RG's is to assist the reserve component units in their geographical area in all areas of training and readiness. They do not become involved in the installation planning for post-mobilization training and validation. However, after mobilization the MAT Chief has the responsibility for determining the readiness level of the units prior to deployment for the validating authority.

MAT teams are usually organized into command and staff sections, and further, into functional teams which are based on the type of units that will be supported at the mobilization station. The organization is similar to the Readiness Groups in peacetime with an augmentation from the Maneuver Training Commands and the Centralized Aviation Readiness Training Team. The individual members of the MAT do not function in the mobilization field during peacetime and generally do not work with training status for deployment. There is a great deal of individual expertise in a MAT, however. The Maneuver Training Command personnel run exercises for reserve component units, while the RG's

work "hands on" with the units to improve readiness.

Since the RG's are the nucleus of the MAT's, they should be the cornerstone for post-mobilization training and validation. RG's should have a mobilization section at the same level as their training, logistics, and administration sections. This proposed section, in addition to assisting the assigned units in their mobilization planning, should have the responsibility for the MAT portion of the installation mobilization plan. They should also develop and internal SOP for validation.

The validation process is a subjective military judgement call that should determine, not if, but when, the unit is capable of performing its combat mission. A unit should be considered mission capable if it has sufficient personnel, equipment, and expertise (both individual and collective) to perform its wartime mission. The determination is normally made by the mobilization station commander, with the exception of General Officer Commands which are evaluated by the appropriate CONUSA commander.

The equipment and personnel status is a fairly easy call, but the expertise of the individual soldier, and of the unit collectively, is another matter. The best measure is probably the "Go or No go" on each task listed on the METL. DA is currently evaluating the use of this standard.

There is a lack of standards and procedures, in any case. The Second US Army After Action Report on exercise HICKORY RESPONSE 85 was specific concerning the Fort Bragg MAT which was composed of RG Bragg personnel only:

...there is no standard organization, overall MAT mission statement or individual team member duties outlined. This indicates a need for a standard MAT organization mission and function to be included in FORMDEPS as a model throughout CONUS. This standard concept should also include assembly, training, and exchange of information by MAT's.<sup>3</sup>

The problem is that the MAT's do not exist until mobilization. That is why the RG's should be the executive agent for this action as well as any other post-mobilization installation training and validation requirements. The fact is that there is little MAT guidance at FORSCOM level.

Once policy is set and plans are written, the MAT's should be exercised during every possible mobilization exercise. First US Army is planning an exercise in FY88 called GOLDEN THRUST which will mobilize 10 percent of the command in conjunction with the two weeks annual training. It will include an analysis of mobilization station capabilities. An evaluation of the MAT concept should be added, also.

Another problem confronting the MAT Chief after mobilization is the requirement to conduct ARTEPS for units which have not had a recent one. The staff and resources are not available in most cases to accomplish this task in spite of the FORSCOM requirement.

The problem of evaluating units that are split physically, or that have different readiness levels among subordinate units has yet to be resolved. How does a MAT Chief advise his mob-station commander on the readiness of a Division when one Brigade is not combat ready? Where does the MAT Chief get the additional assets to train the one unit up to standard? One RG Commander feels that the failure to meet battlefield survivability standards will be evident with the combat service support units. How could a Separate Brigade be deployed when the Support Battalion is not up to standard? This could be especially critical when operating in an environment with a high level rear area threat.

## SUMMARY

The problems and situations that are likely to come up in an actual post-mobilization training and validation situation at any particular installation cannot all be predicted by even the best planning process. However, it is possible to improve cost effectiveness and reduce duplication.

To improve the lot of the installation mob-planner, a centralized post-mobilization training requirement system based on the METL needs to be developed in conjunction with the ongoing automation of PTSR. A shortfall tracking system for CONUS-wide employment would focus attention on critical areas.

The PTSR report itself must be automated down to unit and installation level with real time input and private access for system users. The attention is always placed on the administration and logistics, but the training is in integral part of readiness and often drives the other hard requirements.

Readiness Groups and their associated MAT responsibilities are being overlooked and need FORSCOM guidance, central planning and procedures, and exercises.

Finally, the METL should be an on-going, internal and external evaluation standard that drives all other training reports and requirements. It should be a part of the post-mobilization training and support requirements system that determines training readiness in a current verifiable manner. Upon mobilization, the mobilization station commander would require an update, develop the post-mobilization training plan, implement the MAT portion of the installation training plan, and prepare the units for deployment. The gaining



commander in combat could then be confident in the combat readiness of the reserve component units and his ability to successfully prosecute the war.

#### ENDNOTES

1. General John Wickham, Army Chief of Staff, January 1984.
2. Interview with Max Ray, DA Civilian, First US Army, Fort Meade, MD,  
20 February 1986.
3. Second US Army, After Action Report - Exercise HICKORY RESPONSE 85,  
p. II-E-12.
4. Interview with COL Ralph Newman, Readiness Group, Fort Indiantown  
Gap PA, 25 February 1986.

END  
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